

About REBA Case Study briefs

What is RHVP?

The Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) supports improvements in policy and programme approaches to hunger and vulnerability in southern Africa with particular emphasis on the role of social protection.

The Regional Evidence Building Agenda (REBA)

Evidence-building, together with capacity-building and policy change, is one of RHVP's three interlinked activities. The Regional Evidence Building Agenda (REBA) is a cohesive framework that has guided the Programme's cross-country evidence-related activities between April 2006 and September 2007. The REBA consists of individual case studies of 20 ongoing social transfer programmes together with thematic studies covering cross-cutting design and implementation issues. The studies were carried out by locally commissioned researchers, mostly working through national research and consultancy institutions, in the six southern African countries covered by RHVP (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe)†. All the case studies involved close collaboration with the agencies – government departments and government-appointed bodies, local and international NGOs, UN agencies and communities – that were implementing the social protection schemes under review. The research was supported and guided by a core team of international mentors which included Stephen Devereux (IDS, Sussex), Frank Ellis (ODG, University of East Anglia) and Lionel Cliffe (University of Leeds) and was coordinated and managed by Philip White (ODG).

REBA Aims

The REBA aims to support RHVP's efforts to promote improved policy and programme approaches to social transfers as a means of addressing hunger and vulnerability. REBA findings are feeding into a range of policy, advocacy and research outputs and processes, including policy briefs, best practice guidelines, national and regional learning events for policymakers, practitioners and civil society, a film series and research publications. In addition, by working through a network of national consultants, the REBA aims to increase national capacity to carry out analytical research on hunger and vulnerability within the six countries.

REBA Case Study Briefs

This series of briefs was prepared by Frank Ellis on the basis of the 20 individual case studies undertaken under the REBA. Based on these findings and those of the accompanying thematic studies, a parallel series of thematic briefs that cut across the case studies is also in preparation. The full reports of each case study will be made available in early 2008.

Introduction: Themes and Patterns

Overview

This briefing paper introduces a set of 20 social transfer case studies drawn from six countries of the southern African region in the period 2006-07. The six countries are Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and case studies were selected within and across them as the outcome of a stakeholder consultation process that emphasized knowledge gaps and scope for lesson learning. The list of case studies including their countries, titles and acronyms is provided in Table 1 below.

The chosen case studies provide a varied representation of social protection practice in southern Africa. Some are small scale and of limited duration, while others have national coverage and are permanently in place, secured by legislation and provided as a right to their recipients. Small scale projects are often innovative, and some were designed as pilots or experiments in cash transfers to vulnerable beneficiaries, with a view to their potential for scaling up in the future.

Table 1: Social Transfer Case Studies 2006-07

Brief No.	Country	Social Protection Scheme	Acronym*
1	Malawi	Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer	DECT
2	Zambia	Social Cash Transfers	SCTs
3	Lesotho	Old Age Pension	OAP
4	Mozambique	Input Trade Fairs	ITFs
5	Malawi	Input Subsidy Programme	ISP
6	Swaziland	Old Age Grant	OAG
7	Mozambique	Food Subsidy Programme	PSA**
8	Zimbabwe	Urban Food Programme	UFP
9	Mozambique	Food Assistance Programme	FAP
10	Zambia	Food Security Pack	FSP
11	Malawi	Public Works Programmes	PWPs
12	Mozambique	Education Material Fairs	EMFs
13	Lesotho	Burial Societies	BSs
14	Swaziland	Neighbourhood Care Points for OVC***	NCPs
15	Swaziland	School Bursaries for OVC	SBs
16	Swaziland	Chiefs' Fields for OVC	CFs
17	Swaziland	Farm Inputs for Child-Headed HHS	CHHHS
18	Zimbabwe	Small Livestock Transfers	SLTs
19	Lesotho	School Feeding	SF
20	Zimbabwe	Rural Micro Finance	RMF

* these acronyms are often used as a shorthand for the case-studies, especially in tables

** Programa de Subsídio de Alimentos in Portuguese

*** OVC = orphans and vulnerable children

In the period during which the case-studies were undertaken a great deal of interest by donors, NGOs and governments centred on cash transfers as an approach to securing minimum acceptable nutrition and basic needs for those most vulnerable to hunger in the region. For this reason, an important strand running through the case-studies (but not present in all of them) comprises the scope and limitations of cash transfers, especially as contrasted to reliance on food aid not just in emergencies but as continuing support to the chronically vulnerable. Another way that this strand is expressed is in terms of the policy objective to replace ad hoc responses to crisis situations by 'predictable funding for predictable needs'. If only the chronically vulnerable were protected on a continuing basis from insufficient food consumption, the argument goes, then emergency action would be required much less often, and indeed would only happen when unusually severe or widespread livelihood shocks occurred.

In order to permit comparability across diverse forms and scales of social transfer, the research underlying these case studies was organized so that representation of six themes was included in all of them. The six themes were: vulnerability, targeting, coordination and coverage, cost effectiveness, market effects and asset building. This introductory briefing paper is presented along similar thematic lines; however, it also sets out to identify clusters and patterns in the scale, design and implementation of the social transfer schemes listed in Table 1.

Vulnerability, Coverage and Scale

The aim of social protection is to reduce vulnerability to hunger and other forms of extreme deprivation. It does this primarily by providing welfare support and underpinning people's livelihoods so that they are protected against a collapse in their food consumption, and are prevented from having to sell their assets in order to secure minimum acceptable levels of nutrition and other basic needs. Social protection thus acts on both the risk and ability to cope branches of commonly accepted definitions of vulnerability (Box 1). It reduces risk by giving people some form of backup should a shock occur to them, and it stops the erosion of assets that otherwise lead to people becoming more vulnerable in the future.

Box 1: Definition of Vulnerability

Vulnerability and chronic poverty are closely linked, especially for population categories categorized as the 'ultra poor' i.e. only just able, or unable, to meet their minimum acceptable nutrition requirements. Nevertheless, vulnerability involves a relationship rather than a fixed consumption reference point – the relationship is between the level of risk of adverse events occurring and the ability of the household to deal with such events when they occur: high risk and low ability to deal with adverse events (shocks) means high vulnerability.

High risk is the likelihood of occurrence of personal shocks (e.g. disease, incapacity, death of family members, livestock death, crop failure) and broader disasters (drought, floods, frosts etc.). Low ability to deal with shocks is caused by depleted household assets (household goods, farm implements, livestock, bicycles etc.) and lack of alternative employment or income sources to compensate for failure in the main occupation of the household (often semi-subsistence farming). The twin character of vulnerability – level of risk and ability to cope – means that its level can be reduced either by reducing risk, or by increasing ability to cope, or some combination of both.

The coverage of different social protection schemes is highly variable, giving social transfers both within countries and across the region a distinctly 'patchwork' character. Much social protection in the region seems accidental and anarchic: individual NGOs, UN agencies, quasi-state agencies, and public bodies undertake a diverse range of distinct social transfers to different social groups, according to criteria that are internal to each organisation, or that follow the shifting priorities of funding agencies. The accidental character of this social protection means that both duplication (particular types of beneficiary being targeted by two or more different agencies) and exclusion (deserving individuals and families being missed entirely from all types of social transfer) in coverage can occur. The exceptions to this patchwork character are programmes with national coverage, exemplified by the social pensions of Lesotho and Swaziland (Case Studies No.3 and 6) and the input subsidy programme in Malawi (Case Study No.5).

The coverage, scale and vulnerability reduction aims of the case studies can be captured in part by clustering them by organisational scale (project or programme) and their principle objective as between providing social security or stimulating stronger livelihoods (see Table 2). In making this latter distinction, it is not intended to suggest that social welfare types of social protection cannot result in livelihood building; on the contrary, several of the case studies provide evidence of welfare transfers being utilised by recipients for livelihood building purposes. Nevertheless, there is an obvious difference in the underlying approach to reducing vulnerability between for example a pension transfer (protecting the food consumption of older people) and an input subsidy scheme (designed to increase the productivity and incomes of active farmers).

The classification suggested in Table 2 can be refined further by focussing more specifically on the vulnerability reduction approach taken by the different case studies. Here a slightly different, but complementary, clustering of the case-studies occurs, according to the following alternative ways of tackling vulnerability:

A. Protecting the consumption of older persons plus their household members. These are the explicit aims of social pension programmes, as exemplified by the Lesotho Old Age Pension and the Swaziland Old Age Grant (Case Studies No.3 and 6). In both these cases, the provision of a pension is seen as achieving a more widespread

reduction in vulnerability than occurs just for the older people themselves. In particular, it is noted that grandparents often end up looking after AIDS orphans so that pension income can also mitigate the plight of a significant proportion of OVC.

Pensions involve a trade-off between age threshold, coverage and budgetary cost. An age threshold of 70 (the Lesotho OAP) means fewer families are supported and for a shorter duration than an age threshold of 60 (the Swaziland OAG). Data for Lesotho shows that the OAP corresponded to roughly 3 per cent of government recurrent expenditure in 2006/07, and it has been estimated that lowering the age threshold to 65 would raise this to 5.2 per cent. Reluctance to do this is likely to be more to do with establishing rights (on the part of older people) and obligations (on government) than to do with cost factors taken in isolation.

B. Protecting the consumption of the destitute.

Several of the social transfer case studies are schemes designed explicitly to reach the poorest and most vulnerable members of society, both rural and urban. The pilot social cash transfer schemes in Zambia do this (Case Study No.2), as does the Food Subsidy Programme in Mozambique (Case Study No.7) and the Urban Food Programme in Zimbabwe (Case Study No.8). A lot of interest surrounds the notion that the destitute in southern African countries can be protected in the long term

Table 2: A First Classification of Social Transfer Case-Studies

Scale	Welfare Transfers		Livelihood Building Transfers			
Project or Scheme	1.	Malawi	DECT	4.	Mozambique	ITFs
	2.	Zambia	SCTs	16.	Swaziland	CFs
	8.	Zimbabwe	UFP	17.	Swaziland	CHHHs
	9.	Mozambique	FAP	18.	Zimbabwe	SLTs
	12.	Mozambique	EMFs	20.	Zimbabwe	RFM
	13.	Lesotho	BSs			
	14.	Swaziland	NCPs			
	15.	Swaziland	SBs			
	19.	Lesotho	SF			
National Programme	3.	Lesotho	OAP	5.	Malawi	ISP
	6.	Swaziland	OAG	10.	Zambia	FSP
	7.	Mozambique	PSA			
	11.	Malawi	PWPs			

by cash transfers, and the Zambia pilots exemplify this focus. The Urban Food Programme in Zimbabwe, operating in the context of hyperinflation, utilises food vouchers with the same intention in mind.

A key policy issue in tackling the destitution that accompanies extreme poverty and high vulnerability is identifying the destitute. The Kalomo Scheme in Zambia pioneered the notion that the destitute comprise about 10 per cent of the country's population. This figure is empirically based. It constitutes the proportion of households found in the 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey to have a per capita food consumption under 1400 kcal per day, and that in addition lack able-bodied labour. This category of households is sometimes referred to as the 'non-viable' poor, and tends to comprise elderly single-person households, elderly households with young children and orphans, households headed by HIV/AIDS widows, and households containing individuals with disabilities that make it very difficult for them to gain a living. This 10 per cent rule has acquired some authenticity, though not without ongoing debate, and has been used as the cut-off point defining the most vulnerable in the other Zambia cash transfer pilots, as well as in more recent Malawi cash transfer schemes.

- C. Protecting the consumption of those facing seasonal food deficits.** Many rural dwellers in the southern African countries are particularly prone to insufficient access to food on a seasonal basis, in the lean season leading up to the next harvest. The DECT scheme in Malawi was a seasonal scheme (Case Study No.1), as also have been Public Works Programmes (PWPs) in Malawi for many years (Case Study No.11). The intention of such schemes is principally to prevent hunger during the critical period of 3-4 months before the next maize crop is mature and ready to harvest. In Malawi, this period occurs from December to March.

Social transfer responses to seasonal hunger are by definition of short duration. In the DECT project, cash transfers were made monthly for four months. For PWPs, either food or cash is provided on a self-targeting basis in return for work on public infrastructure or community projects. A ceiling number of days work by any particular individual is usually applied. For example, in one of the

Malawi PWPs, the transfer amount was US\$1.6 for an 8-hour task unit, up to a maximum of 10 such task units (allowing for a maximum cash income earning of MK 2,000 or US\$16 per person).

- D. Encouraging farm input use for increased farm output.** This more obviously and directly than most forms of social protection sets out to tackle causes of high vulnerability (the low yields, outputs and incomes of poor small farmers) rather than just its symptoms (Case Studies Nos.4, 5, 10, 16 and 17). There are important differences between schemes studied. The Malawi ISP has nationwide coverage of all small maize and tobacco producers; while Zambia FSP is specifically designated towards poor small farmers who are unlikely to purchase fertilizer even at subsidised prices (in Zambia, a separate scheme covers fertilizer subsidies for those that can afford to pay). Meanwhile the Mozambique Input Trade Fairs have the limited scope of providing a recovery mechanism for farmers affected by drought or floods, and each individual beneficiary only has a one-time chance to take advantage of the scheme. Different again are Chiefs' Fields and Child-Headed Household Inputs for OVC in Swaziland with very minor coverage indeed even within the limited constituency of estimated total numbers of OVC.

On the scale of the Malawi ISP, farm input subsidies become mainstream development policy and overlap with social protection only insofar as a social transfer is involved in the form of the subsidy. Moreover, the Malawi ISP is unlikely to benefit directly the most vulnerable rural dwellers since ability to pay the subsidised price is a prerequisite for purchasing fertilizer and seeds (this is a criticism often levelled at input subsidies). Nevertheless, the vulnerable can benefit from increases in yields and output stimulated by the subsidy due to lower prices for their food purchases and rising employment opportunities in a more buoyant rural sector. In other examples, the social protection element of input subsidies is more explicit due to their orientation towards designated vulnerable groups.

In order to reduce vulnerability, input subsidies in rainfed agriculture require complementary circumstances to be helpful rather than hostile; in other words, the amount and pattern of rainfall must be favourable for crop growth and maturation across the growing season. In 2005/06 and 2006/07 Malawi seems to have been especially fortunate in

this regard. When events are not so favourable, input subsidies can be an expensive way of funding crop failure. Some of the ITFs in Mozambique as well as similar experiments in Zimbabwe have failed due to adverse natural events of this kind.

Input subsidies have a chequered history as a means of raising rural incomes and lowering rural vulnerability. In an earlier era, they were regarded as making a significant contribution to sustained yield growth in Asia (the Green Revolution), but experience in Africa was mixed and disappointing overall. On a national scale, they can take a heavy toll on government budgets, and politically they become more difficult to lower or remove the longer that farmers become accustomed to paying artificially low fertilizer prices.

E. Breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Social protection that prevents undernutrition in children and improves their chances of acquiring education and skills has intergenerational effects that will not be perceived until they grow up and are hopefully able to create better life chances than their parents. All social protection that successfully targets very poor families and provides a sufficient level of transfer to benefit the children in the household has this potential effect. Nevertheless, some forms of social protection specifically aim at this intergenerational goal. Amongst the social transfer case-studies, education material fairs in Mozambique (Case Study No.12), social transfers to OVC in Swaziland (Case Studies No.14-17), and school feeding in Lesotho (Case Study No.19) correspond to this type of social protection.

These schemes display a great range of coverage and cumulative effect. The EMFs in Mozambique were experimental pilots in just six communities in two districts providing vulnerable children with a single chance to improve their life chances through participation in education. OVC initiatives in Swaziland include providing OVC with more stable social reference points as well as food (NCPs – see Case Study No.14), school feeding, and a chance to gain agricultural skills through collective and individual farming. School feeding of all primary school children throughout their time in school has a broader outreach and multiple aims (Case Study No.19)

F. Social transfers designed to ameliorate or reverse the impacts of AIDS. Several of the case study schemes are designed to address the nutritional and basic needs of families containing individuals with AIDS-related illnesses, or the social and consumption needs of children orphaned by AIDS. This category includes the Food Assistance Programme in Mozambique that provides food rations for families in which one or more members are receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART), as well as the projects in Swaziland that address the well-being of OVC (Case Studies No.14-17). A further example in this category are the burial societies in Lesotho (Case Study No.13) that seek to protect families from asset erosion in the event of the death of a household member, by providing for all or part of funeral costs.

While these case studies address AIDS and its deleterious impacts as their main focus, in truth a considerable proportion of all schemes studied take into account AIDS impacts in the criteria that they establish for eligibility to scheme benefits. Thus households lacking able-bodied labour due to AIDS-related deaths, households containing OVC, and elderly looking after orphaned grandchildren, all describe circumstances that tend to enter the multiple criteria utilised by different agencies to target the most vulnerable people in society (see Targeting below)

Coordination

Efforts are being made in most countries of the region to establish improved coordinating mechanisms for social protection. In some cases, this coordination begins with legislating a definite social protection policy or framework, and setting up a body within government to oversee and implement the framework. These formal frameworks tend to be oriented in the first instance towards solving the problem of coordination between government departments by locating responsibility for public and donor-assisted social protection in one place. In this they tend to be only partially successful because there remain distinct interests across different line ministries in different types of social transfer: for example, the Ministry of Education may be interested in school feeding, the Ministry of Health in home-based care for AIDS patients, and the Ministry of Agriculture in subsidised inputs to farmers.

Coordination is desirable for a number of key reasons. One is in order to foster a common understanding across agencies regarding who are the most vulnerable to hunger and how they can best be reached by social transfers. A second is to avoid duplication of effort and waste of resources caused by different agencies (both inside and outside government) devising their own channels for tackling the same problems of social deprivation. A third is to avoid inadvertent exclusion caused by no one having an overview of social and spatial patterns of poverty and vulnerability, and therefore significant gaps in coverage occurring in the efforts of different agencies. A fourth one is simply organisational: any social protection scheme requires coordination between its partners and stakeholders (donors, line ministries, implementing agencies, traditional leaders, community groups) in order for effective implementation to take place.

The case studies in this series fall into roughly five overlapping groups as far as coordination is concerned. These are described briefly as follows, and Table 2 above remains relevant as a reference point, since coordination patterns to some degree (but not wholly) correspond to the differences of scale and intention portrayed in that table:

- A. National programmes overseen by a single line ministry.** The two pension schemes in Lesotho and Swaziland (Case Study Nos.3 and 6), the national programme for the destitute in Mozambique (Case Study No.7), the input subsidy programme in Malawi (Case Study No.5), and school feeding in Lesotho (Case Study No.19) correspond to this category. These require a prior commitment by central government towards recurrent funding (Ministry of Finance) as well as operational coordination appropriate to a national scale of delivery.
- B. Pilot projects designed for scaling up within a coordinated SP strategy.** The single case study that corresponds to this rubric is the social cash transfer pilots in Zambia (Case Study No.2). These are designed to explore the implications of delivering cash transfers to the most vulnerable, within the context of the national Social Protection Strategy and under the coordination of the Department for Social Welfare.
- C. Projects of limited duration funded by donors and implemented by NGOs, UN agencies, or government ministries, as well as local partners.** This set includes the Malawi DECT project (Case Study No.1), the three Zimbabwe NGO-led projects (Case Studies No.8, 18 and 20), the ITF and EMF projects in Mozambique (Case Studies No.4 and 12), the WFP food assistance project in Mozambique (Case Study No.9) and the JICA-funded farm inputs for child-headed households in Swaziland (Case Study No.17). Schemes in this category tend to coordinate between stakeholders at an operational level, but are not part of a larger design or oversight formulated at a strategic level by government. A partial exception are the Mozambique ITFs that are integrated into the Ministry of Agriculture strategy towards recovery from crop failures.
- D. National programmes with varying funding run semi-autonomously from government.** This category includes public works programmes (PWPs) in Malawi (Case Study No.11) run by the semi-autonomous body, the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF); and the food security programme (FSP) in Zambia, jointly overseen by two parent ministries (MACO and MCDSS) and implemented by a national NGO called Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) (Case Study No.10). It seems likely that projects of this type may be prone to governance problems, and their varying funding means that coverage and effectiveness vary from one year to the next.
- E. Coordination around the social protection needs of a particular vulnerable group.** The example here is the National Programme of Action (NPA) for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in Swaziland. This coordinates resources and coverage for neighbourhood care points (NCPs) and school bursaries (SBs) for OVC (Case Studies No.14 and 15), under the umbrella of the National Emergency Response Council on HIV and AIDS (NERCHA). Interestingly, two further projects in this area – chiefs' fields for OVC and farm inputs for child-headed OVC households – come under NERCHA but are not included in the NPA (Case Studies No.16 and 17).

Targeting

Targeting refers to the selection process by which social transfer schemes seek to reach an intended group of beneficiaries. In simple terms, the eventual outcome of targeting is a list of names (individual names or household names) who are the designated recipients of the social transfer that is delivered. Ideally this list should reflect accurately the particular circumstances of poverty and vulnerability that the social transfer sets out to ameliorate. The list should neither include names of individuals or households whose situation is not as bad as that of the intended beneficiaries, nor exclude individuals or households whose situation falls within the guidelines established.

Many different scales and complexities of targeting are represented by the case studies examined in this series. The most straightforward type is categorical targeting such as pensions, where a single criterion (an age threshold) determines whether or not someone falls within the category targeted. The most complicated types are those that approach identifying a beneficiary group (e.g. destitute households containing no income earners) through a series of proxy indicators (e.g. elderly widows caring for children under 15). The principle mechanisms for targeting found in this set of case-studies may be distinguished from each other broadly as follows:

- A. Categorical targeting.** Applies in particular to pensions (Case Studies No.3 and 6) where the category is everyone over 70 (Lesotho) or 60 (Swaziland), although even in these cases there are some exclusions (people obtaining civil service pensions, and in Swaziland a process of registration is supposed to exclude better off older people). OVC are also a category targeted in several case studies (Nos.14-17)
- B. Proxy indicators.** The target group is destitute households. In one case this is specified as the poorest 10 per cent (Case Study No.2). Various proxies for destitution are used e.g. one meal per day, begging from neighbours, elderly-, sick- or disabled-household heads, elderly looking after orphans, widows living alone etc. Often it is the absence of income earning capability (lack of able bodied labour) that is the key attribute that various proxy indicators seek to pin down. Lack of land for cultivation may also apply. Many of the case studies in this set use proxy indicators of poverty and vulnerability as targeting criteria (Case Studies No.1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 18).

- C. Multiple eligibility.** This often includes proxy indicators of poverty or vulnerability in association with one or two primary criteria for eligibility. Eligibility may be conferred by events e.g. drought- or flood-affected farmers (Case Study No. 4), or by resources that the household must be able to deliver e.g. ability to pay the subsidised price of fertilizer, access to land, or adequate labour for agricultural production. Multiple eligibility often takes the form of several stages or layers in the selection process: for example, access to land but under one hectare (primary eligibility criterion), elderly but with access to labour, female headed households not in gainful employment, child-headed households etc. (secondary proxy criteria) (Case Study No.10)
- D. Geographic targeting.** Usually associated with vulnerability assessment mapping (VAM) that forecasts where hunger gaps are expected to occur (Case Studies No.1 and 11). Geographical targeting rarely occurs on its own, except in emergency situations where the entire population of a particular area is found to be under acute stress. More typically, geographical location is a first criterion supplemented by eligibility or proxy indicator criteria.
- E. Self targeting.** In the case of public works programmes (Case Study No.10), this works by setting the benefit (food or cash) below the market wage rate and raising the cost of participation (heavy manual labour) to discourage the non-needy from turning up. Burial societies in Lesotho (Case Study No.13) are also self-selecting: membership is voluntary and determined by ability to make contributions.

Over the past decade or so, targeting has moved from being predominantly top down in character (eligibility decisions made by implementing agencies), to being consultative at local levels (especially by involving district officials and traditional leaders), and participatory at community level (typically through community selection committees). Participatory methods seem to offer the best way forward for achieving accuracy in the final compilation of beneficiary lists (e.g. Case Study No.1), but can involve a rather elaborate process, and it is difficult to tell how well they would work in the absence of an enthusiastic NGO guiding the process.

Table 3: Case Studies Classified by Short Term or Long Term Intended Impact

Mainly Transfer Focus			Long Term Outcome Intended			
1.	Malawi	DECT	4.	Mozambique	ITFs	Farm output recovery
2.	Zambia	SCTs	5.	Malawi	ISP	Farm output growth
3.	Lesotho	OAP	9.	Mozambique	FAP	AIDS patients able to work
6.	Swaziland	OAG	10.	Zambia	FSP	Crop yields and output up
7.	Mozambique	PSA	11.	Malawi	PWPs	Public assets created
8.	Zimbabwe	UFP	12.	Mozambique	EMFs	School attendance up
13.	Lesotho	BSs	14.	Swaziland	NCPs	OVC social inclusion
			15.	Swaziland	SBs	OVC school attendance up
			16.	Swaziland	CFs	OVC food communal farm
			17.	Swaziland	CHHs	OVC own food production
			18.	Zimbabwe	SLTs	HH livestock holdings up
			19.	Lesotho	SF	School attendance up
			20.	Zimbabwe	RFM	Improving livelihoods

Cost Effectiveness

One aspect of cost effectiveness (the input side) is the efficiency of social protection delivery i.e. the total cost of delivering US\$1 worth of transfers to beneficiaries. Data on the input efficiency of transfers is provided in many of the case studies, and most schemes fall within the range of US\$1.20 to US\$1.40 required to deliver US\$1 worth of transfers, with a clustering around US\$1.30. Since schemes vary considerably in terms of factors such as remoteness, seasonality, types of transfer, and variety of different aims, cost efficiency figures on their own may not fairly convey their relative performance at delivering their intended portfolio of benefits at minimum costs.

The other aspect of cost effectiveness (the output side) concerns the relationship between stated intentions and actual outcomes achieved, taking into account the slippages and unintended side-effects that occur between goals and impacts. In some types of social transfer it is the sustainability of outcomes that is critical, for example, the achievement of sustained higher yields as the result of subsidising farm inputs for small poor farmers.

The case studies in this collection can be distinguished between those where the transfer itself is the end result (for example, cash transfers to the destitute preventing hunger), and those where a longer term sustained impact is built into scheme design (for example, crop yields in the case of farm inputs, or school attendance in the case of school feeding). The majority of the case studies fall into the latter category (13 out of the 20 case studies

– see Table 3). It is unfortunately true that many social transfer schemes do not monitor longer term project impacts, with the result that whether or not sustained outcomes are achieved is often unknown.

Market Effects

It is well understood that alternative forms of social protection have impacts on markets; for example, food aid in a deficit market can help to constrain rising food prices, while in a non-deficit market it may cause prices to fall thus acting as a disincentive to production of a market surplus; likewise, one of the concerns about cash transfers is that they may have an inflationary effect on food prices, especially in remote areas where markets do not function very well and there are high transport costs involved in bringing new supplies into an area.

For all cash transfers, the market effect that poses the greatest challenge is not necessarily the impact of the scheme on inflation, but rather the impact of a price rise in the national staple food on the real ability of the transfer to protect recipients from food entitlement failures. In most countries, it is the national maize price that is key, and seasonal and annual instability in the level of the maize price causes uneven and often unpredictable changes in the purchasing power of the cash transfer amount that has been set. When the price of maize rises steeply, as it does when a shortage sets in, the real purchasing power of the transfer plummets as also does the protection from hunger that it affords its recipients (Case Studies 1, 2, 3, 6).

The impact of cash and food transfers on food prices are amongst an array of market effects provoked by social protection, some deliberately built into scheme design, while others occur as side effects of scheme implementation. Input subsidies and vouchers lower the purchase cost of farm inputs in order to provoke increased use (Case Studies No.4, 5, 10, 16, 17). In seeking this they will also cause switching by existing purchasers of the inputs at full cost to the low cost supplies, thus the net increase in use is lower than the total quantity subsidised (see Case Study No.5). If they are successful in provoking rising output, input subsidies may also cause falling prices in output markets. Cash transfers may cause changes in labour markets by reducing labour supply at the minimum rural wage, causing the wage to rise as employers seek to hire labour. Some social transfer schemes purchase their intended transfers locally (e.g. livestock in Case Study No.18) in order to support local markets. Other examples of these market effects can be found in the individual case studies.

Asset Protection and Building

Social transfers have various different asset protection and asset building effects. Cash or food transfers protect against the pressure to sell assets in order to buy food. Burial societies (Case Study No.13) provide informal insurance against the heavy costs suddenly imposed on poor families by the death of a family member. Some social transfers have explicit asset building goals (for example, small livestock transfers in Zimbabwe - Case Study No.18), while others allow for potential asset protection or building by easing the pressure on poor people's exceedingly scarce resources.

Case studies can be distinguished to some extent according to the type of asset that they contribute towards building. These distinctions are not watertight, however, since cash or food transfers can release resources for other purposes that would otherwise have been spent on food, and cash is highly flexible between different uses. Indeed any increase in household resources potentially allows for asset accumulation by recipient households due to substitution effects of this kind. A broad classification of the asset effects of different types of transfer is set out here as follows:

A. Asset protection. Assets are protected when social transfers enable households to avoid selling them in order to achieve minimum acceptable levels of food consumption. Cash and food transfers (Case

Studies No.1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13 and 19) have potential asset protection qualities of this kind.

B. Human capital (health and education). Some social transfers are concerned with improving the health, and therefore the productive capability, of recipients (Case Study No.9); while others are concerned with raising the human capital of the next generation through education (Case Studies No.12 and 15); and still others with the social inclusion of OVC, including health and education aspects (Case Study No.14).

C. Land as an asset. Land becomes a more valuable asset when its productivity rises, and therefore social transfers that aim to raise yields on farms through improved cultivation practices, more diverse cropping systems, or greater input use at the same time improve land as an asset (Case Studies No.4, 5, 10, 16, 17).

D. Livestock as an asset. The multiple purpose of livestock in livelihood systems is well known – form of saving, means of accumulation (through flock or herd growth, or trading up from small stock to big stock), source of consumption and income (milk, eggs), social reciprocity (transfers for ceremonies and feasts etc.). In the absence of social protection, livestock often play a critical role in coping strategies that erode assets in order to maintain food consumption. One case study directly builds household livestock holdings as its goal (Case Study No.18), while others contain varying potential for livestock acquisition from cash transfers or resources released by other transfers.

E. Physical and infrastructural assets. One case study allows for acquisition of agricultural implements (Case Study No.4), while public works programmes are concerned with building physical infrastructure such as roads or irrigation channels (Case Study No.11).

F. Building social capital. Some projects appeal specifically to strengthening or reviving pre-existing social customs of care towards community members that have been hit by misfortune. This applies to chiefs' fields (Case Study No.16) as well as other OVC initiatives in Swaziland. It is also mentioned as a subsidiary benefit in several other social transfer schemes in this series. Some care is required in interpreting these claims. On occasions

the appeal is to a mythical state of social cohesion from long ago, while in others the past customary reciprocity may be true enough but contemporary livelihood stresses make it impossible for the majority of community members to comply with past practice in this regard.

Summary

The 20 social transfer case studies in this briefing paper series provide an illuminating range of experience regarding social protection in the southern African region. Table 4 provides a summary of case study attributes by mapping themes and sub-themes to projects and countries across all of the case studies. For purposes of exposition all case studies examine the themes of vulnerability, targeting, cost effectiveness, coordination, coverage, market effects and asset building. This introduction has revealed that there are discernable patterns of intention and outcome with respect to these themes across the different case studies, thus facilitating comparison and lesson learning from them. The lesson learning itself belongs to the final briefing paper in the series in which experiences are evaluated with respect to their strengths and flaws, allowing for provisional conclusions to be drawn about desirable attributes of future social protection in the region.

More Information

REBA material, including these briefs and fuller case study reports, as well as information regarding the REBA process can be viewed and downloaded from: http://www.wahenga.net/index.php/core_activities/building_evidence

Annex Table 1: Summary of Case Study Features

Case Study No.:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Country:	MAL	ZAM	LES	MOZ	MAL	SWA	MOZ	ZIM	MOZ	ZAM	MAL	MOZ	LES	SWA	SWA	SWA	CHHs SWA	ZIM	LES	ZIM	
Scheme:	DECT	SCTs	OAP	ITFs	ISP	OAG	PSA	UFP	FAP	FSP	PWPs	EMFs	BSS	NCPS	SBs	CFs	CHHs SWA	SLTs	SF	RMF	
Vulnerability reduction																					
A. Protect consumption of elderly and HH members			•			•															
B. Protect consumption of destitute		•					•	•													
C. Protect consumption against seasonal food deficits	•										•										
D. Encourage farm input use				•	•					•						•	•				
E. Break intergenerational poverty												•		•	•	•	•		•		
F. Mitigate or reverse AIDS impacts													•	•	•	•	•				
Coordination																					
A. National programmes, single line ministry			•		•	•	•												•		
B. Pilots for scaling up in SP strategy		•																			
C. Limited duration projects, donor funded	•			•				•	•			•						•	•	•	
D. National programmes, semi-autonomous from govt.										•	•										
E. Coordination around needs of specific vulnerable group														•	•	•	•				
Targeting																					
A. Categorical			•			•								•	•	•	•				
B. Proxy indicators		•																			
C. Multiple eligibility				•						•											
D. Geographic targeting	•										•										
E. Self-targeting										•			•								
Cost-effectiveness																					
A. Transfer focus	•	•	•			•	•	•					•								
B. Long-term impact intended				•	•				•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Market effects																					
A. Transfer value subject to maize price	•	•	•			•															
B. Impacts from intervening in agricultural input markets				•	•					•						•	•				
Asset effects																					
A. Asset protection	•	•	•			•	•	•	•		•		•						•		
B. Human capital enhancement									•			•		•	•						
C. Land as an asset				•	•					•						•	•				
D. Livestock as an asset																		•			
E. Physical and infrastructural assets				•							•										
F. Building social capital																•					

Annex Table 2: Research and implementing partners for REBA case studies

	Research partners	Programme implementing partners
Lesotho School Feeding Burial Societies Old Age Pension	ISAS, Nat University of Lesotho ISAS, Nat University of Lesotho ISAS, Nat University of Lesotho	Min of Education & Training/ WFP Local communities Min of Finance & Development Planning
Malawi Public Works Programmes Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer Input Subsidy Programme	Wadonda Consult, Malawi Wadonda Consult, Malawi Centre for Soc Res, Univ of Malawi	Malawi Social Action Fund Concern Worldwide/Opp Int Bank Malawi Min of Agriculture & Food Security
Mozambique Food Subsidy Programme Food Assistance Programme Input Trade Fairs Education Materials Fairs	Rachel Waterhouse Rachel Waterhouse Paulo Mole Paulo Mole	Nat Institute for Social Welfare (INAS) INAS/Min of Health/WFP/NGOs Ministry of Agriculture/FAO Ministry of Education/SC-UK
Swaziland Neighbourhood Care Points OVC Old Age Grant Chief's Fields for OVC Farm Inputs for Child-Headed HHs School Bursaries for OVC	Coordinating Assembly of NGOs Coordinating Assembly of NGOs Coordinating Assembly of NGOs Coordinating Assembly of NGOs Coordinating Assembly of NGOs	UNICEF/ECHO/WFP/NGOs Department of Social Welfare Min of Agriculture/NERCHA JICA/EU Ministry of Education
Zambia Social Cash Transfers Food Security Pack	RuralNet Associates, Zambia RuralNet Associates, Zambia	CARE/MCDSS Programme against Malnutrition
Zimbabwe Urban Food Programme Small Livestock Transfers Rural Micro Finance	CASS, Univ of Zimbabwe CASS, Univ of Zimbabwe CASS, Univ of Zimbabwe	ActionAid Catholic Relief Services CARE

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