In spite of another bumper harvest in Malawi, the World Food Programme (WFP) has launched a food aid appeal. In response, RHVP would like to launch its own appeal to WFP: please reconsider!

WFP contend that, although there is an overall national surplus, half a million poor and highly vulnerable people (primarily orphans and the chronically sick) will not be able to secure adequate food supplies in the coming months.

With nearly half the population of Malawi living in chronic food insecurity, few would dispute the need for assistance to the most vulnerable, even in a surplus year. But what must surely be questioned is the decision to provide such assistance in the form of "direct food transfers", especially in the light of the rather frail explanation that "beneficiary categories may not have opportunities to benefit from the (domestic food) surplus except through direct food transfers".

Why, after so much has been invested in Malawi, not least by WFP themselves, to affirm the role of cash transfers and to determine how best to deliver them, has WFP opted for a food based approach? After all, with plentiful food supplies, the constraint facing the beneficiary categories is clearly one of access rather than physical availability.

Is it because food markets are not functioning? There are no details in WFP's appeal regarding the distribution of beneficiaries and there is no reference to assistance being specifically targeted to remoter and less accessible parts of the country. Unless there are exceptional (and thus essentially localised) market disruptions, food markets across the country should be relatively well supplied in a year of national surplus.

Is it because there is insufficient experience with the delivery of cash or insufficient evidence regarding the positive impact of cash transfers on food security? No: the delivery and the impact of cash transfers have been tested time and time again in Malawi, and the evidence from past experience is overwhelmingly positive, especially when there is, as in this case, a clear and concise definition of the target group. Indeed, WFP themselves recently "piloted" cash transfers in Malawi (in Chikwawa, and Machinga) precisely to gain such implementation experience.

Is it because there is a perceived reluctance on the part of WFP's donors to fund cash based programmes? Certainly not: at least two important donors have openly asserted their support to the use of social cash transfers to address chronic food insecurity in Malawi.

Is it because WFP doesn't have a mandate to manage cash based programmes? No: WFP's 2007 Interim Directive opened the door to cash transfer pilots; and WFP is positioning itself strongly as a "food assistance" agency rather than a "food aid" agency, explicitly in order to be able to accommodate cash transfers in its toolbox of instruments. Moreover, the Malawi country office is a key partner in WFP's "Special Initiative for Cash and Voucher Programming" (SICVP) in southern Africa; one of the key objectives of the (successful!) Chikwawa/Machinga pilot was to "assess the appropriateness and feasibility of cash interventions as a complement or an alternative to food aid in response to food insecurity"; and the previous county director of WFP in Malawi was an enthusiastic advocate of market-based responses.

Is it because intended beneficiaries have a preference to food rather than cash? Maybe, but have they been asked? And, even if there was some apprehension on their part, couldn't they be better informed of the relative merits of different types of transfers and thus reassured that cash is the best option in the prevailing circumstances?

Is it because it would be quicker to distribute food rather than cash? With the depth of experience in the delivery of cash transfers amongst WFP's distribution partners in Malawi there is no reason why it should be. Indeed, the evidence indicates the contrary.

Is it because the Government of Malawi is reluctant to embrace a new, cash based, approach? Without being privy to discussions between the Government and WFP it is difficult to answer this question. One would like to know if alternative transfer options were presented or discussed before the WFP appeal was launched (in this respect, it was drawn to our attention that, despite being a member of the Humanitarian Response Committee, WFP did not share their intentions to launch this appeal with the Committee). Governments are traditionally conservative and it is prudent to be risk averse when dealing with the lives of the most vulnerable. Nevertheless, the Government has been engaged in the social protection debate for a number of years and is fully aware of the wealth of positive evidence about the use of cash as a means of addressing chronic vulnerability. And the Government's own social support policy, now before Cabinet, explicitly favours cash as the preferred response: one key strategy in the policy is "protection... through seasonal cash transfers (except where food transfers would be more appropriate)".

It is evident that none of these possible objections to a cash based approach stand up to scrutiny. In fact, when examining current conditions in Malawi it is hard not to conclude that circumstances for undertaking a successful cash based response are now as conducive as they will ever be: there are adequate domestic supplies, there are no major market disruptions, there is ample evidence of the positive impact of cash transfers and there is considerable experience in the delivery of direct cash transfers. In terms of commitments, all key stakeholders - the Government, WFP, donors, civil society, the private sector and even beneficiaries themselves (as is evident from past programmes) - have expressed a preference for the use of cash transfers in addressing food insecurity when conditions are favourable. Well, they don't get any more favourable than this!